Defining disease and disorder remains a key conceptual question in philosophy of medicine and psychiatry, and is currently a very practical matter for psychiatric nosology, given the new Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fifth Edition, and the upcoming International Classification of Diseases, 11th Revision. There have been advances in the cognitive-affective science of human categorization, and it is timely to consider implications for our understanding of the category of psychiatric disorder. The category of mental disorder has graded boundaries, and conditions within this category can be conceptualized using MEDICAL or MORAL metaphors. One key set of constructs used in MEDICAL metaphors relates to the notion of dysfunction, and it may, in turn, be useful to conceptualize such dysfunction in evolutionary terms. For typical disorders, it is relatively easy to agree that dysfunction is present. However, for atypical disorders, there may be considerable debate about the presence and extent of dysfunction. Rational arguments can be brought to bear to help decide whether particular entities should be included in our nosologies, and, if so, what their boundaries should be. However, it is appropriate that there should be ongoing debate on diagnostic validity, clinical utility, and other relevant facts and values, for cases that are difficult to decide. The perspective here can be illustrated using many nosological debates within the anxiety disorders and the obsessive-compulsive and related disorders, including the question of delineating normal from abnormal anxiety, of deciding whether anxiety is psychiatric or medical, and the debate about the optimal metastructure for anxiety disorders.
Highlights
• Advances in cognitive-affective science of human categorization may have implications for nosology; for example, they help explain why some disorders are typical and others atypical.
• Typical disorders can often be conceptualized using MEDICAL metaphors, which employ notions such as dysfunction, and there is agreement that these deserve treatment.
• Atypical disorders can sometimes be conceptualized using MORAL metaphors, which employ notions such as irresponsibility, and there may be controversy about treatment need.
• The notion that disorders are typical or atypical, and boundaries fuzzy, may be useful in considering the clinical significance criterion, the medical exclusion criterion, and spectrum constructs.
• It is appropriate that there is ongoing debate about difficult cases, but facts and values can be reasonably weighed to decide on the inclusion and boundaries of these entities.
D efining disease and disorder remains a key conceptual question in philosophy of medicine and psychiatry. Also, this is a practical matter for psychiatric nosology, currently requiring attention, given DSM-5 and ICD-11 revisions. Both DSM-5 and ICD-11 have addressed a definition of mental disorder, as other decisions hinge on the stance taken. 1, 2 DSM revisions have been accompanied by debate on particularly contentious conditions. 3, 4 Conceptual questions about the nature and boundaries of mental disorder also impact on a range of decisions, including thresholds for common mental disorders, categorization of disorders as psychiatric rather than medical and (or) neurological, and questions about whether to split or lump putatively related conditions. [5] [6] [7] Advances in the cognitive-affective science of human categorization make it timely to consider its implications for our understanding of the category of psychiatric disorder. My paper provides a brief account of such work, to emphasize that the construct of disorder has graded boundaries, and can be described using MEDICAL or MORAL metaphors. These terms are capitalized, using the style of the cognitive-affective literature on metaphors, on which they draw. 8, 9 MEDICAL metaphors of disorder often rely on ideas such as breakdown, notions that have recently been reconceptualized using evolutionary science. 10, 11 This framework is then used to address debates about mental disorder boundaries, using exemplars from anxiety disorders and obsessive-compulsive and related disorders.
Cognitive-Affective Science of Categories
Human categories may be understood and investigated using theories and data from a range of cognitive-affective sciences. The perspective here draws extensively on the work of the linguist Lakoff and colleagues (see Lakoff 8 and Lakoff and Johnson 9 ), whose conceptual approach has emphasized the embodied nature of human categories, and who have also stressed the value of a multidisciplinary and empirical approach.
Rosch 12 and her colleagues' work on the cognitive psychology of categories exemplifies this empirical tradition. They have noted that within the category of birds, entities such as sparrows are quickly recognized, while ostriches are more slowly recognized, as birds. Thus birds that fly are more typical, but the category of birds does extend to more atypical birds that cannot fly. A list of essential and necessary characteristics that define birds, it turns out, is easier requested than done. From a scientific point of view, a first approximation of operational criteria for the category of birds (for example, feathered creatures that fly), requires further modification based on fieldwork (for example, most birds fly, but not all), and ultimately requires exploration of underlying mechanisms (for example, birds are descended from a primitive creature that had feathers).
Subsequent cognitive-affective science research has built on this work on graded categories. For example, work in linguistics has shown how basic categories are extended in various ways using metaphors. 8 Research in artificial intelligence has shown how neural networks can provide rigorous simulations of how categories work. 13 Anthropological and neuroscience data have shown how categories (for example, colour categories) not only vary across time and place but also reflect universal aspects of psychobiology. 9 A developmental perspective emphasizes how categories change over time. 14 If philosophy is viewed as a cognitive-affective science, 15 then conceptual debates in this area are relevant. Indeed, empirical work on categories derives part of its importance from its relevance to long-standing debates in philosophy of science, language, and medicine. One heuristic is to contrast classical and critical positions on these debates. A classical philosophical position emphasizes the importance of defining categories in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions (for example, a square is a shape with 4 equal sides at right angles). 11 In philosophy of science, the argument is that only by carefully operationalizing constructs is it possible to make progress. In philosophy of language, the argument is that verification is key to meaning, with knowledge based on observation. In philosophy of medicine, the argument is that diseases can and should be operationally defined using rigorous and objective diagnostic criteria.
A critical position in philosophy takes quite a different approach to human categories. 11 Human categories cannot be defined using necessary and sufficient criteria; categories vary across time and place (for example, a weed is an unwanted plant, and so what counts as a weed depends on who is counting). In philosophy of science, the argument is that scientists move from one paradigm to another, replacing one way of seeing the world with another. In philosophy of language, the argument is that validation is key to establishing meaning; knowledge is based on interpersonal agreement. In philosophy of medicine, the argument is that diseases are social constructions, and are reconstructed in different times and places.
From the perspective of Rosch 12 and Lakoff's work (see Lakoff 8 and Lakoff and Johnson 9 ), the truth lies somewhere between the 2 conceptual extremes of the classical and the critical. The category of birds is a social construction, which may differ somewhat across time and place, with some cultures including and some excluding atypical exemplars, such as ostriches. However, there are reasonable arguments for ensuring that the definition of birds does not include the criterion of flying, given that ostriches have so much in common, from an anatomical perspective, with flying birds. As science advances, so we can be more certain of the precise molecular-evolutionary relation between sparrows and ostriches, as well as those of even more difficult exemplars, such as the platypus. A position that science not only is socially constructed but also uncovers real underlying mechanisms 16,17 may be termed integrative or synthetic. 11, 18 Analogous positions can be taken to the categories of diseases. From a classical perspective, diseases, like squares, are objective entities that can be defined in terms of necessary and sufficient criteria. From a critical perspective, diseases, like weeds, are social constructions that vary across time and place. From a synthetic perspective, while diseases are social constructions, the questions of whether an entity is a disease, and if so of its optimal boundaries, can be rationally debated based on the relevant evidence. In the case of typical diseases, such as severe acute infection, there is near-universal agreement that the entity is a disease, and that sufferers deserve the so-called sick role. 19 In atypical diseases, such as a mild infection, or alcoholism, there may be significant disagreement. Some may claim that alcoholism is closer to a crime or a sin than to a genuine medical condition. This raises the question of what metaphors are used to discuss disorder, and what underlying mechanisms (that is, the issue of diagnostic validity), or other factors (for example, issues of clinical utility), are relevant to drawing disease boundaries.
What Metaphors Are Used to Describe Disorder?
The major metaphors used to describe disorders are MEDICAL. 11 Lakoff's capitalization of key metaphors helps emphasize that language is not simply a mirror of reality, but rather that it involves many suppositions. For example, consider disorders as a breakdown. Etiology is then something that results in this breakdown, and treatment something that fixes the breakdown. Or disorders can be considered as an imbalance. Etiology is then something that results in this imbalance, and treatment something that ensures balance.
These are metaphors; there is no absolute necessity to use them when thinking through a particular behavioural deviance. While excessive substance use may represent a so-called breakdown of the mind, or a mental imbalance, others may argue for a more MORAL metaphor. Here, drinking too much may, for example, simply reflect a criminal act or a spiritual lapse. These metaphors entail a different set of causes and interventions. Very often the focus would be on the person who displays the behavioural deviance to take responsibility. With this metaphor, the sick role is not provided; instead, society may demand punishment or spiritual intervention.
Given that taxonomic debate about the boundaries of the category of birds may turn from anatomical findings to molecular-evolutionary studies, can we take an analogous approach to disorders? Certainly, psychobiological dysfunction can be defined in evolutionary terms. 20, 21 A syndrome that results in not being able to function optimally in one's environment of evolutionary adaptedness (commonly referred to as EEA) 22 may be argued to represent a dysfunction.
However, there are difficulties in relying on evolutionary studies to draw disorder boundaries. For birds, boundaries can be drawn using data on vertebrate anatomy. When there is disagreement, scientists can investigate underlying biological mechanisms, including work on changes in DNA throughout evolution. However, in the case of disorder, phenomenological studies may not be enough; even if we agree on the characteristics of excessive drinking, this may represent brain-mind dysfunction for one classifier, and personal irresponsibility for another. There is no readily available DNA for an answer 23 ; some may argue that excessive alcohol consumption is characterized by evolutionarily defined dysfunction and represents a disorder, but others may argue that reward systems are evolutionarily derived and that allowing external substances to hijack them represents a failure of will.
Implications
There are many implications of this cognitive-affective science approach to the categorization of disorder that deserve further elaboration.
First, for a typical disorder, as for a typical bird, there is good agreement, even across time and place. Nearuniversally, a severe acute infection will be considered a disorder (characterized by, for example, a breakdown or an imbalance). Thus someone with sudden onset of a severe infection will invariably be allowed to take the sick role; they are not considered responsible for getting ill, they are considered deserving of recuperation time, and they are encouraged to seek medical attention.
Second, for an atypical disorder, there is potential for disagreement, with different views across time and place. Alcoholism may be treated like a disorder; people are seen to have an illness, for which they are not morally blameworthy, and that is deserving of medical treatment. However, alcoholism may be regarded primarily as a crime or sin, for which people are morally responsible, and for which they deserve sanction. (The situation is complexified given that medical treatments for alcoholism may insist on taking responsibility for crimes committed under the influence).
Third, we need to debate rigorously atypical cases of disorder. For example, the more evidence there is that alcoholism is characterized by an underlying psychobiological disruption, and that such underlying disruption responds to medical intervention, the more valid a MEDICAL metaphor seems. Evidence for an underlying psychobiological disruption may include genetic or brain imaging data. For example, some people with alcoholism may have particular variants in genes encoding for alcohol metabolism. Nevertheless, no single argument is likely to be sufficient; for example, while it may be noteworthy that alcoholism responds costefficiently to pharmacological modalities, not all disorders are responsive to treatment. Instead, a broad range of facts and values may be relevant to assessing diagnostic validity and clinical utility, and delineating disorder boundaries.
Fourth, psychobiological and interventional data on a particular entity may not be sufficient to persuade everyone that the relevant condition is, in fact, a disorder. For example, in the case of paraphilic coercive disorder, 24, 25 even if relevant genetic variations could be found, and response to medical treatment documented, a MORAL metaphor may remain more convincing to most. It may well be reasonable to argue that the most appropriate approach is for people with the relevant behaviours to accept responsibility for their lusts (even if these, like other behaviours, have a genetic and brain basis). Even if a particular medication is useful in decreasing libido, the argument may be that taking such medication is simply part of their moral responsibility, rather than the correction of any underlying dysfunction. Again, a range of issues, including the trade-off between potential benefits and harms, 26 must be judiciously weighed.
Exemplars From Anxiety Disorders and Obsessive-Compulsive and Related Disorders
In the case of anxiety and obsessive-compulsive and related disorders, some additional concerns arise. First, what is the division between normal and pathological when a fear response is normative (this raises the question of DSM's clinical significance criteria)? Second, is an anxiety disorder known to be due to alterations in brain neuroanatomy-neurochemistry still a psychiatric disorder (this raises the question of DSM's general medical exclusion criterion)? Third, how do we decide whether disorder x lies on anxiety spectrum y (this is the issue of the optimal DSM meta-structure)? 27 Some anxiety disorders may be typical psychiatric disorders. Patients with severe PTSD seem much like a patient with severe infection. Many would see PTSD as a breakdown or an imbalance; people cannot be blamed for developing the disorder, and deserve medical treatment. 28 Similarly, many would argue that severe hoarding or skin-picking symptoms represent a breakdown or an imbalance; there is a diagnosable disorder deserving of medical intervention. 29, 30 However, there are atypical exemplars of anxiety disorders. Here, we consider 3.
First, consider the patient with anxiety in social situations. 31 One argument here is that anxiety in social situations may be an evolutionary adaptation. 32 The question then becomes where to draw the line between normality and abnormality? This is particularly problematic given that variation in social anxiety falls along a continuum. 33 DSM-IV relies a great deal on the clinical significance criterion, with disorders diagnosed based on distress-impairment. DSM-5 and ICD-11 have considered differentiating between symptom severity and such distress-impairment, 34, 35 but this turns out to be difficult for social phobia. The phenomenology of anxiety symptoms in people with anxiety disorders and anxiety in normal anxiety responses cannot always easily be distinguished, and determinations of whether anxiety is excessive (for example, out of proportion to the relevant circumstances or context) 36, 37 may, like decisions about the clinical significance criterion, have to rely substantially on clinical judgment. I argue that in conditions and cases such as this, the line between normality and abnormality should be drawn based on a reasoned weighing of a broad range of considerations, including cost-efficiency of treatment. The question of where to draw the line for clinical hypercholesterolemia provides a useful exemplar. 6 One cholesterol level was used to indicate risk for cardiovascular disease. With the introduction of statins, a different cut-off was used to indicate the need for treatment. With availability of cheaper generic drugs, a third even lower cut-off was used to indicate the value of cost-efficient and effective treatment. A similar set of arguments should be applicable to determining the cutoffs for social anxiety disorder. (However, what if one were able to take a medication to improve social skills; would this be a treatment [for a disorder] or an enhancement [that is, simply bolstering a normal capacity]? There is arguably no way of deciding at present. This falls into the category of things we need to continue to study and debate.)
Second, what about the patient with anxiety symptoms due to a general medical condition that leads to changes in brain neuroanatomy-neurochemistry? This question relates to another set of diagnostic criteria in DSM, that is, the general medical exclusion criteria. Here again, our concepts of disorder are not as clear-cut as our language suggests; closer examination reveals typical and atypical cases, with fuzzy boundaries at times. In the typical case, say, a patient with panic attacks due to hypothyroidism, the underlying general medical condition seems to play a key causal role, and conversely, there is little evidence that the psychiatric disorder would have occurred in the absence of this disorder; thus it is useful to diagnose and treat the underlying general medical disorder.
However, in other cases, there is more debate. For example, consider OCD after streptococcal infection (that is, pedatric autoimmunine neuropsychiatrist disorder associated with Streptococcus). 38 While some would regard this as OCD due to a general medical disorder (of the autoimmune system), others would argue that autoimmune mechanisms play a role in multiple psychiatric disorders and that such cases are best conceptualized as patients having primary OCD. Indeed, for many of the anxiety disorders, there is likely to be considerable fuzziness; anxiety symptoms may often present within the context of some biological variations (for example, of particular genes, or perhaps involving particular autoimmune mechanisms), and some psychosocial stressors.
It is perhaps wise to keep the general medical exclusion criterion, given that in typical cases, such as anxiety disorder due to hypothyroidism, attention to the general medical disorder is clinically useful. Still, it may be important to highlight in the DSM text that the situation may be more complex then it appears-psychiatric disorders are likely to be multifactorial in their origins, involving a range of biological and psychosocial mechanisms. We do not want to reclassify psychiatric disorders as general medical disorders as soon as some of the relevant neurobiological mechanisms are delineated, rather it may be important to emphasize that the boundary between what is psychiatric, what is medical, and normality may be fuzzy at times. This point may be relevant to future attempts to define dementia based on biomarkers. There will be a temptation to argue that if biomarker x is present (say, evidence of tau proteins on a brain scan) then a disorder y (say, early Alzheimer dementia) should be diagnosed and treated. However, it may turn out that decision making is more complex; diagnostic and treatment decisions may require a broad range of considerations, including, for example, assessment of how impaired the person is, the presence of factors such as social support, and the cost-efficiency of the intervention.
Third, what about the question of whether an entity belongs in, say, the category of anxiety disorders, or the obsessivecompulsive and related disorders, or trauma and stressrelated disorders? There have been several controversies here, including that surrounding the construct of obsessivecompulsive spectrum disorders. 39 Again, I argue that our concepts of disorder are not as clear-cut as our language appears to indicate, and closer examination reveals typical and atypical cases, thus there are multiple possible ways of establishing boundaries.
The DSM-5 Workgroup on Anxiety, Obsessive-Compulsive, Posttraumatic and Dissociative Disorders argued that, in the case of OCD, there are both similarities and differences between anxiety disorders and OCD. 40 The workgroup attempted to resolve the debate by changing the name of the category to "anxiety and obsessive-compulsive disorders." At times, underlying such an approach is the notion that different disorders have essential properties, and that objective nosological decisions can be made by examining such properties. 27 Insofar as OCD, like other anxiety disorders, for example, is characterized by anxiety, involves mechanisms such as fear-processing and avoidance, and responds to similar treatments, the classification of OCD with anxiety disorders increases the validity and clinical utility of the nosology. Given that we know the necessary and sufficient features of anxiety disorders and of OCD, we should be able to reach an optimal decision about their relatedness based on a direct examination of the evidence at hand.
However, delineating a meta-structure requires making multiple simultaneous decisions; this is not an optimal solution perhaps if, say, tic disorders are going to be included as obsessive-compulsive and related disorders, because tic disorders may not have a great deal of overlap with most anxiety disorders. Further, the availability of an alphabetical coding scheme potentially allows a more fine-grained nosology, including a separate chapter for obsessive-compulsive and related disorders. 41 Indeed, on close examination, while some obsessive-compulsive and related disorders, such as OCD, may be considered typical exemplars of the category of anxiety disorders and OCD (for example, they are characterized by anxiety, involve mechanisms such as fear-processing and avoidance, and may respond to treatments used for anxiety disorders), others, such as Tourette disorder, may be considered atypical exemplars (for example, they are characterized by repetitive symptoms and a genetic relation to OCD, and may respond to interventions used in the treatment of movement disorders). Thus the determination of whether to combine anxiety disorders and obsessive-compulsive and related disorders in one category, or indeed whether to include tic disorders in obsessive-compulsive and related disorders, turns out to be far from straightforward.
Indeed, any particular approach to the meta-structure would seem to have pros and cons that must be carefully considered. A more fine-grained approach has the advantage of emphasizing advances in our understanding of how anxiety disorders, obsessive-compulsive and related disorders, and posttraumatic disorders differ regarding some validators (for example, in having somewhat different psychobiological mechanisms and requiring somewhat different treatment approaches). Such an approach may help maximize the opportunities for specialist clinicians to recognize differences across these conditions, and to provide more specifically tailored treatments. Conversely, a more coarse-grained approach has the benefit of emphasizing important similarities across these conditions (for example, similarities between anxiety disorders and OCD). Such an approach may help maximize the opportunities for primary care clinicians to recognize a broader array of conditions, and provide broad-span but efficacious interventions. Thus the question of what disorders should be regarded as central (or typical) when constructing the boundaries of a nosology must consider a range of issues regarding diagnostic validity and clinical utility.
Given the complexity of nosological decision making, it would not be surprising if views changed over time. After the demonstration that serotonin reuptake inhibitors (commonly referred to as SRIs) are selectively effective for OCD and BDD, it is compelling to have these disorders reside in the same chapter. But after cognitivebehavioural theories have demonstrated important overlaps between anxiety constructs and BDD constructs, then it may be more relevant to have this condition be classified as an "anxiety and obsessive-compulsive disorder." Even small nosological changes can have considerable unforeseen consequences. 41 Thus choices should be made circumspectly, and after appropriate debate, about a broad range of issues, not only about underlying mechanisms, but also about a range of other relevant facts and values, and it is appropriate to continue to revisit nosological decision making over time. We should not see ongoing revisions of the DSM and the ICD as indicative of failure to understand the essential nature of psychiatric disorders, but rather as pointing to a willingness to continue to grapple with and reconsider the blurry boundaries of disease entities, based on growing knowledge and experience.
Conclusion
Cognitive-affective science provides a framework for understanding the development and use of categories. Such work indicates that both the classical and critical perspectives of disorder are incorrect. Instead, an integrative approach, emphasizing both the social nature of human categorization and the real mechanisms that underpin observable phenomena, 11, 18 is needed. This perspective further indicates that while some disorders are typical and apparently characterized by dysfunction, other disorders are atypical and debate about the presence and extent of an underlying dysfunction does and should continue. In anxiety disorders and obsessive-compulsive and related disorders, boundaries between normality and pathology can be fuzzy, and thus should be drawn after judicious weighing of a range of considerations (including diagnostic validity and clinical utility). Like other psychiatric disorders, anxiety disorders and obsessive-compulsive and related disorders are multifactorial, with some etiological factors being more medical in nature; nevertheless, such conditions remain psychiatric disorders. Decisions about the meta-structure of anxiety disorders again require careful weighing of a broad range of issues, with any particular approach having both benefits and disadvantages. This perspective does not necessarily argue for the inclusion or exclusion of any particular disorder or chapter of disorders in the DSM or the ICD, but it does argue for the ongoing revisiting of the complex decision making that can be expected of, and that is central to, psychiatric nosology.
